In this expository paper we illustrate the generality of game theoretic probability protocols of Shafer and Vovk (2001) in finite-horizon discrete games. By restricting ourselves to finite-horizon discrete games, we can explicitly describe how discrete distributions with finite support and the discrete pricing formulas, such as the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula, are naturally derived from game-theoretic probability protocols. Corresponding to any discrete distribution with finite support, we construct a finite-horizon discrete game, a replicating strategy of Skeptic, and a neutral forecasting strategy of Forecaster, such that the discrete distribution is derived from the game. Construction of a replicating strategy is the same as in the standard arbitrage arguments of pricing European options in the binomial tree models. However the game theoretic framework is advantageous because no a priori probabilistic assumption is needed.
Introduction
In the game theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001) , probability distributions and probability models are not assumed a priori but derived as logical consequences of certain protocol of a game between two players "Skeptic" and "Reality". In this game Skeptic tries to become rich by exploiting patterns in the moves of Reality. In order to prevent Skeptic from becoming rich, Reality is in a sense forced to behave probabilistically. Therefore probability distributions are determined by the protocol of the game. This feature of the game theoretic probability is well illustrated by Shafer and Vovk (2001) in their derivation of Skeptic's strategy forcing the strong law of large numbers (Chapter 3) and the derivation of Black-Scholes formula (Chapter 9). Also in Takeuchi's exposition of the game theoretic probability and finance (Takeuchi (2004) ) this point is discussed with many interesting examples. Recently Kumon and Takemura (2005) gave a very simple strategy forcing the strong law of large numbers.
In the standard stochastic derivation of option pricing formulas, empirical probability is assumed first, but then by arbitrage arguments, the empirical probability is replaced by the risk neutral probability and the price of an option is given as the expected value with respect to the risk neutral probability. The risk neutral probability is often explained as a purely operational device useful in expressing the option price in a convenient form. On the other hand in the game theoretic probability the risk neutral probability is more substantial, in the sense that Reality is forced to behave according to the risk neutral probability to avoid arbitrage by Skeptic. We should mention here that in Shafer and Vovk (2001) "forcing" is used only for infinite-horizon games. In this paper we somewhat informally use the word to mean that Reality should avoid arbitrage by Skeptic in the setting of finite-horizon games.
Additional flexibility of game theoretic probability is gained by introducing the third player "Forecaster" into the game. At the beginning of each round Forecaster sets the price for Reality's move. By appropriately specifying the strategy of Forecaster, Reality's moves can be forced to follow any prespecified distribution.
In this paper we demonstrate the above features of the game theoretic probability in the setting of finite-horizon discrete games. For expository purposes we start with the simplest setting of the coin-tossing game and derive binomial distribution in Section 2 and give an analogous derivation of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula in Section 3. We discuss derivation of hypergeometric distribution and Polya's distribution in Section 4 in order to illustrate the role of Forecaster. Then in Section 5 we discuss derivation of an arbitrary discrete distribution with finite support. Multivariate extension is given in Section 6. Some preliminary material on game theoretic probability is given in Appendix.
Derivation of binomial distribution
Consider the finite-horizon fair-coin game in Section 6.1 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) . Its protocol is given as follows.
Fair-Coin Game
Protocol:
Reality announces x n ∈ {−1, 1}.
In this protocol a game theoretic version of Chebyshev inequality is proved in (6.9) of S&V in the following form:
where S N = x 1 + · · · + x N and P denotes the lower probability. Actually the equality of the upper probability and the lower probability
holds here and this probability is given by binomial distribution. Although this fact is contained in a more general statement of Proposition 8.5 of S&V, we give a full proof of this fact employing standard arbitrage arguments. In order to treat success probability p = 1/2, let us consider the following biased-coin game.
Biased-Coin Game
Reality announces x n ∈ {a, −b}. K n := K n−1 + M n x n . END FOR As above we write S n = x 1 + · · · + x n . Let S 0 = 0. Consider a random variable x(ξ) = η(S N ) which depends only on S N (European option). Then we have the following basic result.
Theorem 2.1 The upper and the lower expected values of η(S N ) coincide and given bȳ
where p = b/(a + b) is the risk neutral probability.
Proof:
The first step of our proof consists of defining a "candidate" price of the European option. In the second step we verify that the candidate price is actually the precise price, by constructing a replicating strategy.
Letη(n, S n ), S n = −nb, −(n − 1)b + a, . . . na, denote the price of η(S N ) at time n. We require η(n, S n ) to satisfy the following "partial difference equation"
where q = 1 − p. Note that (3) with p = 1/2 is a discrete version of the heat equation. The terminal condition forη(n, S n ) is given bȳ
Starting with the terminal condition (4) we can solve forη(n, S n ) in (3) by backward induction n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 0. Then the initial valueη(0, 0) is easily calculated as
Now we describe a replicating strategy for η(S N ) with the the replicating initial capital η(0, 0). For n = 1, . . . , N, let
Note that a + b can be written as
Therefore M n is the ratio of the increments ofη(n, S n ) and S n and is called the "delta hedge". We now check that this M n gives a replicating strategy P. This can be confirmed by forward induction. At the end of the first round n = 1,
Similarly at the end of round n = 2, we havē
Now by induction we arrive at
. We have confirmed that M n in (5) with the replicating initial capital (2) gives a replicating strategy for η(S N ). Hence the theorem holds by Proposition A.1 in Appendix.
In particular if we take
we see that the equality holds in (1) and the probability is given by binomial distribution.
In this section we took Reality's move space as {a, −b}. This is convenient in comparing Theorem 2.1 with the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula in the next section. However for generalization of binomial distribution to hypergeometric distribution in Section 4, it is more convenient to rescale Reality's move space to {0, 1}. Then we need to introduce the price p for the "ticket" x n . The rescaled protocol is written as follows.
Rescaled Biased-Coin Game Protocol:
Reality announces x n ∈ {0, 1}.
It is clear that the biased-coin game and the rescaled biased-coin game is equivalent by the affine correspondence x n ↔ (a + b)(x n − p), p = b/(a + b). In the rescaled version the expected value in (2) is simply written as
Furthermore, since the increment of S n is normalized to be 1, the replicating strategy in (5) is simply written as
It is also conceptually very important to consider the single step game i.e. the game with N = 1. Note that each round n of the N step biased-coin game can be viewed as a single step game. In the single step game binomial distribution reduces to a Bernoulli trial. This implies that given the price p, Reality's move x n for each round n is exactly the same as a single Bernoulli trial with success probability p. Furthermore this behavior of Reality is dictated solely by the value of p, independently from the past moves x 1 , . . . , x n−1 of Reality. Therefore in the Rescaled Biased-Coin Game, Reality's moves x 1 , . . . , x N are independent Bernoulli trials.
Derivation of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula
Here we present a game theoretic formulation and derivation of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula (Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979)), which is fully discussed in many introductory textbooks on option pricing (e.g., Shreve (2004) , Chapter 2 of Baxter and Rennie (1996), Chapter 8 of Capiński and Zastawniak (2003)). Once an appropriate game is formulated, the rest of the argument is the same as in the previous section.
Our protocol for Cox-Ross-Rubinstein game is as follows.
Cox-Ross-Rubinstein Game Protocol:
Reality announces x n ∈ {u, d}.
is the amount of riskless bond held by Skeptic for the round n and r − 1 is the fixed riskless interest rate. Although by appropriate discounting we may put r = 1 without essential loss of generality (Section 12.1 of S&V), here we leave the interest rate r as in standard derivation of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula.
is called the risk neutral probability.
Let η(S N ) denote a payoff function of a European option depending on S N . Corresponding to Theorem 2.1 we have the following result.
Theorem 3.1 (the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula)
The upper and the lower expected values of η(S N ) coincide and given bȳ
where
is the risk neutral probability.
Proof:
As in the previous section we defineη(n, S n ) by backward induction. Put η(N, S N ) = η(S N ) and for n = N − 1, . . . , 0, definē
Then the initial valueη(0, S 0 ) is easily calculated as
This becomes the replicating initial capital of the following replicating strategy:
Since the game is coherent by the requirement u > r > d, the theorem follows from Proposition A.1.
Hypergeometric distribution and Polya's distribution
In the rescaled biased-coin game of Section 2, the price p of the ticket x n was a constant. Therefore the third player "Forecaster" did not enter the protocol. Now we introduce Forecaster, who sets the price of the ticket at the beginning of each round in the rescaled biased-coin game. We illustrate the role of Forecaster below by deriving the hypergeometric distribution. We also derive Polya's distribution.
Rescaled Biased-Coin Game With Forecaster Protocol:
Note that if Forecaster announces p n > 1 or p n < 0, then Skeptic can become infinitely rich immediately by taking |M n | arbitrarily large. Therefore we can restrict the move space of Forecaster to be [0, 1]. Furthermore if p n = 0, Skeptic can still take M n arbitrarily large, which forces Reality to choose x n = 0. Similarly if p n = 1, then Reality is forced to choose x n = 1. Now consider a strategy of Forecaster. A strategy of Forecaster is called neutral (Section 8.2 of S&V) if p n is determined by the past moves of Reality x 1 . . . x n−1 . From now on we only consider neutral strategies for Forecaster. Furthermore for simplicity we consider neutral strategy depending on S n−1 = x 1 + · · · + x n−1 and write p n = p n (S n−1 ), which we may call "Markovian neutral strategy". In Markovian neutral strategy Forecaster only needs to keep S n−1 in memory to choose his move.
Consider an urn with ν 1 red balls and ν 2 black balls, where ν 1 + ν 2 ≥ N. Let x n = 1 correspond to drawing a red ball and let x n = 0 correspond to drawing a black ball from the urn by Reality. Let p n be the ratio of red balls in the urn at the n-th round. Then
Actually here we do need to take the positive part of ν 1 − S n−1 , because as remarked above once the boundary S n−1 = ν 1 is attained, then 0 = p n = p n+1 = . . . and Reality is forced to choose 0 = x n = x n+1 = . . . , which results in ν 1 = S n = S n+1 = . . . . Now we write out a game of sampling without replacement from an urn.
Game of Sampling Without Replacement From An Urn
For this game the upper and the lower values of the payoff η(S N ) coincide and are given by the expected value with respect to the hypergeometric distribution:
This result is actually almost obvious from the discussion at the end of Section 2, namely, at each round n Reality's move x n is like drawing a ball from an urn with ν 1 − S n−1 red balls and ν 2 − (n − 1 − S n−1 ) black balls. However it is instructive to look at a formal proof of (9). Define a candidate price of η(S N ) at time n by backward induction:
with the terminal conditionη(N, S N ) = η(S N ). Then by fully expanding the recurrence relation we havē
Actually we do not need the restriction max(0, N −ν 2 ) ≤ S N ≤ min(ν 1 , N) in the summation, because N n=1 p n (S n−1 ) xn (1 − p n (S n−1 )) 1−xn = 0 for S N outside of this range. Now it is easily seen that
Now for a given value of S N , the summation just counts the number of ways of choosing S N 1's among x 1 , . . . , x N . It follows that
which proves (9).
The above argument can be immediately applied to Polya's urn model (Section V.2 of Feller (1968) ). In this scheme, when a ball is drawn from an urn, it is replaced and, moreover, c balls of the same color are added. Then the game corresponding to Polya's urn model differs from the game of sampling without replacement only in the specification of Forecaster's neutral strategy. In Polya's urn model
Then as in (2.4) of Section V.2 of Feller (1968) , the expected value of η(S N ) in this game is written asĒ
where the binomial coefficient r n for a real r and nonnegative integer k denotes
Note that (6) and (9) are special cases of (11) with c = 0 and c = −1, respectively. In (9) the range of summation can be taken as m = 0, . . . , N, with the convention (12).
Arbitrary discrete distribution with finite support
So far we have discussed how to derive some classical distributions. We now show that given any distribution on {0, . . . , N}, we can specify a neutral strategy of Forecaster in a game with N rounds such that Reality follows the distribution. Let q m ≥ 0, m = 0, . . . , N, N m=0 q m = 1, denote an arbitrary probability distribution on {0, . . . , N}. By decreasing N if necessary, we assume q N > 0. Definē
Let
The idea here is to let Reality increase S n−1 by 1 with probabilityq n−1 if S n−1 = n − 1 or otherwise let him stop at the current level for the rest of the rounds. Note that p n = p n (S n−1 ) is indeed a function of S n−1 , because it is written as
where I(·) is the indicator function.
Biased-Coin Game With Forecaster For Arbitrary Distribution
The tree of this game is illustrated in Figure 1 . For this game we have the following result. Figure 1 : Tree of the game for arbitrary distribution
Theorem 5.1 The upper and the lower expected values of η(S N ) coincide and given bȳ
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Proof:
As in the case of hypergeometric distribution
In this game, the path leading to S m is uniquely determined as
with m initial 1's. By (13), for this path
The replicating strategy confirming this candidate price is given as
otherwise.
In Theorem 5.1 we have considered a discrete distribution with the support {0, . . . , N}. We can deal with the support of the form {a, a+1, . . . , b}, by letting N = b−a and setting the initial value S 0 = a.
In Section 8.3 of their book, Shafer and Vovk discuss "adding tickets" to make the upper expected value and the lower expected value to coincide. Note that if Reality's move space has more than two elements in a single step game, then the upper expected value is generally larger than the lower expected value. Theorem 5.1 shows that if we add sufficient number of steps to a single step game, the equality of the upper and the lower prices is achieved.
Multivariate extension
In the previous sections we have considered univariate random variable S N . In this section we give a straightforward multivariate extension of the results of the previous sections. We employ the multi-label classification protocol discussed in Vovk, Nouretdinov, Takemura and Shafer (2005) .
Our extension corresponds to generalizing Binomial distribution to multinomial distribution. Let S N = (S 
Multilabel Classification Game With Neutral Forecasting Strategy
S n := S n−1 + x n . END FOR Here "·" denotes the standard inner product of R d . In the above protocol we took the whole R d as the move space of Forecaster. Let
denote the probability simplex spanned by the standard coordinate vectors. If Forecaster announces p n ∈ ∆(X), then by the hyperplane separation theorem Skeptic can choose M n ∈ R d such that he becomes infinitely rich immediately, no matter what move Reality chooses. See Vovk, Nouretdinov, Takemura and Shafer (2005) for a discussion of this point. Therefore we can restrict Forecaster's move space to the probability simplex ∆(X). Also if p i n = 0 for some i, Skeptic can choose M i n arbitrarily large and Reality is forced to choose x i n = 0. We also note that there is a redundancy in the move space of Skeptic, once p n is restricted to lie in ∆(X). M n + c(1, . . . , 1) for any c ∈ R leads to the same increment of the capital process K n . However it is often convenient to ignore this redundancy in specifying Reality's move M n .
For notational simplicity write
As a straightforward generalization of results in the previous sections we have the following theorem. 
The line of the proof is the same as in the previous theorems and we omit the details. The priceη(n, S n ) at time n is defined recursively bȳ
and the replicating strategy M i n is simply given by
From Theorem 6.1 we can easily derive multinomial distribution, multivariate hypergeometric distribution as well as multivariate Polya's distribution.
A generalization of Theorem 5.1 to an arbitrary (d − 1)-dimensional discrete distribution of (S Finally as an illustration of Theorem 6.1 we show how the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula of Section 3 is reduced to our multivariate framework. Define
Furthermore by discounting define
Then the recurrence relation of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein game
Rescaling the values we define d = 2, x * n ∈ {e 1 , e 2 } = {(1, 0), (0, 1)} and
. Therefore the iteration part of the the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein game is written as FOR n = 1, . . . , N Skeptic announces M * n ∈ R 2 . Reality announces x * n ∈ {e 1 , e 2 }. K * n := K * n−1 + M * n · (x * n − p * n ). END FOR This shows that the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula is also a special case of our multivariate extension.
A Preliminaries on game theoretic probability
Here we summarize preliminary material (Chapter 1 of S&V) of the game theoretic probability. We also state a basic proposition on the existence of a replicating strategy and the existence of the game theoretic expectation in a coherent game.
In this paper all the games are finite-horizon games with N rounds. Therefore a path of the game is a finite sequence ξ = x 1 . . . x N of Reality's moves. A random variable x(ξ) denotes a payoff to Skeptic, when Reality chooses the path ξ. Given a strategy P of Skeptic, K P denotes the capital process of P with zero initial capital. Furthermore in this paper we only consider symmetric games, in the sense that if P is a strategy of Skeptic, then −P is also a strategy of Skeptic and
The upper expected valueĒx and the lower expected value Ex of x is defined as Ex = inf{α | ∃P, ∀ξ, K P N (ξ) ≥ x(ξ) − α}, Ex = sup{α | ∃P, ∀ξ, K P N (ξ) ≥ α − x(ξ)}.
In a symmetric game Ex can also be written as Ex = sup{α | ∃P, ∀ξ, α + K P N (ξ) ≤ x(ξ)}.
A game is coherent if Skeptic is not allowed to make money for certain, i.e., ∀P, ∃ξ, K P N (ξ) < 0.
If a game is coherent, thenĒx ≥ Ex for every random variable x (Proposition 7.2 of S&V). We call P a replicating strategy for x with the replicating initial capital α ∈ R if α + K P N (ξ) = x(ξ), ∀ξ.
We now state the following basic fact.
Proposition A.1 In a coherent symmetric game, suppose that P * is a replicating strategy for x with the replicating initial capital α * . Then Ex = Ex = α * .
Proof:
By definition ofĒx we haveĒx ≤ α * . Furthermore in a symmetric game Ex ≥ α * follows from (16). ThereforeĒx ≤ α * ≤ Ex. Combining this with the inequalitȳ Ex ≥ Ex we obtain the proposition.
We should note that the proof of the inequalityĒx ≥ Ex in S&V and the above proof are standard arbitrage arguments.
